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ABSTRACT
This paper examines five bubbles that eventually popped, and discuses the feasibility of
central bank policy.  In all cases, we find that monetary policy was too loose during the
period when the bubble was developing, and that a determined switch from an
accommodating to a tight stance caused "the music to stop". We argue that despite the
severe real effects of asset bubbles in all five examples, the case for targeting them
explicitly is weak. Policy  was flawed because it failed to pay sufficient attention to the
output gap. We also present a more formal test, showing that policy errors influence the
conditional volatility of equity returns as estimated in GARCH-M models. The
conclusion examines US policy today in the light of our historical findings.
1. Introduction
Should asset bubbles be pricked? In many countries, this is one of the most
vexed questions for monetary policy makers. Having successfully conquered high
in‡ation during the 1980s and 1990s, many central banks have been faced with
the ambiguities of success (Krugman 1999). Rapid growth has often proceeded
alongside remarkably tame in‡ation and sharp increases in asset values, especially
equities. The level of the stock market and other asset markets is of obvious con-
cern to monetary policy. Asset prices can in‡uence real activity in a number of
ways. Consumer con…dence may receive a boost via the wealth e¤ect. Investment
may be directed into ultimately unproductive areas. Also, through its bene…cial
e¤ect on household and …rm balance sheets, higher asset prices will a¤ect borrow-
ing and real activity if there are frictions in …nancial markets. Higher volatility
in asset prices can therefore lead to instability in the rest of economy. Bursting
bubbles have a tendency to a¤ect output and employment, sometimes severely;
for these reasons, some authors have argued that central banks should target the
asset prices – and the level of the stock market – directly (Kent and Lowe 1997).
At the same time, identifying existing bubbles, and di¤erentiating them from
rapid increases in asset values driven by a permanent improvement in fundamen-
tals, is no easy matter. Even in such famous cases as the US stock market in
1929, academic debate has failed to agree on the existence or otherwise of a bub-
ble. Irving Fisher’s famous remark in 1929 that ”stocks appear to have reached a
permanently-high plateau” reminds us that, even to the most discerning economic
minds, the evidence appeared to point the other way (Dice 1929). Even after the
crash, Fisher maintained that the stock market had not been overvalued (Fisher
1930). In the case of Japanese stock market in 1989, it was apparently also not
clear to contemporaries that a bubble had developed. The Economist, in one of
its reports on the Japanese stock market in April 1989, argued that
”Japanese investors have become aware of ... the dramatic way
Japan’s blue-chip companies have changed the sources of their earnings
through restructuring. This has made their pro…ts too erratic to give
any meaning to rigid measures such as the p/e ratio. Instead investors
have started to assess a company’s future stream of earnings by looking
at the total value of a …rm’s assets... The implication is that shares
may be underpriced.”
When the British economy was in the middle of a house price and stock market
boom underpinned by the joint e¤ects of …nancial sector deregulation and loose
monetary policy, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, was boasting
about the arrival of a new economy (King 1999):
”The strength and durability of the economic upswing has now ex-
ceeded all post-war records... The plain fact is that the British econ-
omy has been transformed. Prudent …scal policies have given business
and industry the con…dence to expand, while supply side reforms have
gradually removed the barriers to enterprise.”
If contemporaries can get it wrong, and even the bene…t of hindsight provides
little guidance, monetary policy is presented with a conundrum. Hard landings
have often gone wrong, but throttling growth without any apparent resurgence
of in‡ation may be di¢cult to defend in public – especially when central bank
independence is not complete. ”Giving growth a chance” appears to be a frequent
outcome.
Reluctance to raise rates when the economy appears to be in a non-in‡ationary
boom has recently received support from academic quarters. Bernanke and Gertler
(1999) run a number of simulations under di¤erent policy rules for the central
bank. In addition to the traditional in‡ation-targeting approach, they also sim-
ulate the outcome for the overall volatility of in‡ation and output in the case
when the central bank targets the stock market directly. For a wide range of
parameters, they …nd that bubble-busting policy rules would amplify swings in
asset prices, thus defeating the purpose of the exercise.
They also contrast the outcomes of two types of monetary policy, comparing
the US in the 1990s with Japan in the 1980s. Bernanke and Gertler …nd that
monetary policy in Japan was too loose for too long, and that the aggressive
tightening under governor Mieno from 1989 onwards could probably have been
avoided had policy paid su¢cient regard to the rapidly falling output gap in
the late 1980s. In the US, in contrast, they …nd that monetary policy responded
rapidly and appropriately to changes in in‡ation and the level of economic activity;
a repeat of the Japanese boom-and-bust cycle is unlikely. They therefore argue
that direct targeting of the stock market is unnecessary as long as monetary policy
follows orthodox in‡ation-targeting (Bernanke and Gertler 1999).
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2. Monetary Policy during the …ve bubbles
We analyze …ve cases of ”asset bubbles” that have justly become famous in the
literature. Some of them are from the recent past; others are important historical
episodes. We examine US and German policy during the 1920s as well as the
cases of Japan, Sweden and the UK in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In each
case, rapid increases in the price of stocks and/or real estate eventually came to a
halt, only to be reversed sharply. Many authors have also argued that the decline
in asset prices was directly or indirectly responsible for the economic downturns
that followed.
2.1. De…ning bubbles with the bene…t of hindsight
There is no commonly accepted de…nition of a bubble (Kindleberger 1992). The
New Palgrave describes them as periods of price increases, followed by a sudden
and sharp reversal. There is also no widely accepted test that would con…rm or
refute the existence of a bubble in a particular case. Diba and Grossmann (1988)
suggest that, in the case of a rational bubble, the …rst-order di¤erence of stock
prices will be non-stationary. Campbell and Shiller (1987) argue that, if dividends
and stock prices fail to co-integrate, there is evidence of a bubble; a unit root in
the price-dividend ratio implies ”irrational exuberance” (Craine 1993). In almost
all important cases, however, some authors have argued that there is no evidence
of a bubble, while others have maintained that asset prices clearly diverged from
fundamental levels.1 Occasionally, the same authors appear to con…rm one view,
only to refute it the next year (Flood and Garber 1980). Hamilton (1986) argues
that a variation on the ”peso problem” may a¤ect all bubble tests. If market
participants anticipate a rare, but important event a¤ecting fundamentals with a
probability greater zero, then formal tests may show the existence of a bubble –
even if there is none.
With the bene…t of hindsight, we can bypass these problems by de…ning bub-
bles in terms of the magnitudes of asset price movements over a certain period of
time. The exercise is in the spirit of Pagan and Sossounov (1999), who present a
dating mechanism for bull and bear markets. We de…ne bubble episodes as peri-
ods at the end of which asset prices fall by at least 30%, and do not recover their
earlier peak for at least 5 years. We date the beginning of the bubble period as
the point in time when prices …rst exceeded at which they later bottom out. The
1For the 1929 US stock market crash, cf. DeLong and Shleifer 1992 vs. Sirkin 1975.
3
country US Japan Sweden Germany UK
peak 10-1929 12-1989 10-1989 12-1926 9-1987
trough 3-1932 7-1992 9-1992 4-1927 8-1992
start of bubble period 6-1926 8-1986 3-1986 2-1932 12-1986
total fall, peak to trough 78% 61% 55% 75% 31%
Table 2.1: Dating and characteristics of bubble episodes
period from the initial rise of asset values above the value reached at the lower
turning point after the bubble ”popped”. Upper turning points require that the
the level is not surpassed during the six months before or after. By this de…nition,
there are …ve episodes which this paper will consider (table 2.1).
2.2. Monetary policy and the …ve bubbles
We employ the Taylor-rule as a yardstick for monetary policy. Taylor (1993)
suggested that central banks should set interest rates according to the following
rule:
rt = r
f + ¼t + g(yt ¡ y¤) + h(¼t ¡ ¼¤)
where rt is the short-term interest rate at time t, rf is the long term real rate of
interest, ¼¤ is the in‡ation target, yt is output at time t, y¤ is the trend of output,
and g and h are policy parameters. Taylor (1993) suggests g = h = 0:5 and
rf = ¼¤ = 2: Simulation studies have found that sharper responses to increases in
in‡ation, such as h = 1, may improve outcomes (Brayton et al. 1997). Perhaps
because of its simplicity, the Taylor rule has become popular as a way of judging
actual policy. Taylor (1997) examined US monetary policy over the period 1879
to 1997. Periods of low, stable in‡ation appeared to be systematically related to
monetary policy following the Taylor-rule quite closely. How does the conduct of
monetary policy during the bubble episodes compare with the Taylor rule?
2.2.1. The ”roaring twenties” in the US
The Wall Street crash in 1929 is the canonical case of a bubble bursting with
”a bang, not a whimper”. While monetary policy during the Great Depression
continues to be debated, the pivotal role of the stock market’s boom and bust is
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not in question. Followers of the Temin-Bernanke school of thought argue that
the indirect e¤ects on con…dence and balance sheets were in no small measure
responsible for the speed and severity of the downturn in the early 1930s; the
Friedman-Schwartz side of the argument emphasizes excessive monetary tightness.
Bubble busting was high on the list of priorities at the Federal Reserve. Fol-
lowing the death of governor Benjamin Strong in 1928, Adolph Miller pursued a
policy of aggressive tightening combined with a deliberate targeting of stock mar-
ket lending (Cecchetti 1996). All through 1928, the New York Federal Reserve
Bank was trying to raise its discount rate, only to be turned down by the Board.
The Fed’s discount rate eventually moved from 3.5 percent in early 1928 to 6
percent in September 1929. Call money rates followed, rising from 4.78 percent
in March 1928 to 8.6 percent a year later, before falling slightly to 7.2 percent in
September 1929.
Figure 2.1 compares the course of interest rates with the prescriptions of the
Taylor rule. By this yardstick, rates were too low for most of the 1920s. During
the years 1925-27, interest rates should have been 200-400 basis points higher.
Despite the tightening after the death of Strong, this is also true of the year 1929
itself. Only in 1928 was policy more or less on track. M2 (and, to a lesser extent,
M1) continued to rise through 1928 and 1929. The reason for this was not a
lax attitude towards in‡ation. The cpi for these years showed no indication of
in‡ationary pressures; for most of the period, prices were falling at a modest rate.
This was true despite very low unemployment (which fell to 3.2 percent in 1929).
The variable that drives up the interest rate derived from the Taylor rule is the
output gap. Compared to the long-run trend (derived from estimating a quadratic
time trend on monthly data of industrial production for the years 1919-1985), the
economy was growing much too quickly.2 At its most extreme point, in 1929, the
output gap is estimated at more than 10 percent of trend output.
Contemporaries were concerned with what they saw as loose policy. Friedrich
von Hayek (1957, p. 161) argued that ”up to 1927 I should have expected that the
subsequent depression would be very mild. But in that year an entirely unprece-
dented action was taken by the American monetary authorities [who] succeeded,
by means of an easy money policy ... in prolonging the boom for two years beyond
what would otherwise have been its natural end.”
Hayek is referring to the brief episode in 1927 when the Fed lowered its discount
rate by half a percentage point, largely in response to the Bank of England’s
2The use of industrial production in the estimation of output gaps is standard in the literature
(cf. Clarida, Gali and Gertler 1998).
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Figure 2.1: Monetary policy and the stock market, US 1925-30
shortage of gold reserves (Eichengreen 1992, p. 212). The Fed’s loosening was
facilitated by what appeared to be the onset of a recession. Between May and
November 1927, US industrial production fell by 11 percent. What underpinned
the rapid resumption of growth thereafter was in part the cut in interest rates.
Eichengreen suggests that the Fed’s actions as a result of international policy co-
ordination were a success, keeping Britain on the gold standard. He also argues
that ”not one iota of evidence exists that this policy [raising rates in 1927] would
have moderated the recession when it ultimately came”.
The rapid expansion of output, combined with no in‡ationary pressures, was
hailed as the birth of a ”new economy”. With new production techniques such
as assembly lines and new industrial sectors such as automobiles surging ahead,
there appeared little reason to doubt the foundations of the new prosperity.
The consequences for asset prices, however, were not benign. As …gure 2.1
shows, the index of common stocks continued to surge during the period when
monetary policy was too lax. Margin loans in particular grew apace immediately
before the crash.
The debate between the Board and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
at the time was couched in the terms of ”targeting speculation”. It appears that
surging equity prices were, however, only a messenger of misguided economic
policy. The case for tightening could have been made entirely on the basis of the
surge in output and the rapid decline in the pool of employable labor. In the
absence of clear warning signs from the in‡ation rate, the Fed decided to wait
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and see; at the same time, the temporary combination of low in‡ation and rapid
output growth stimulated the belief in a ”new paradigm.”
What was responsible for the benign in‡ation outcome at a time when ca-
pacity utilization increased rapidly and employment surged? The collapse in
international commodity prices in the second half of the 1920s has often been
noted. It is also partly responsible for the lack of in‡ationary pressure in the US
paradox. The price of nonfood agricultural raw materials declined by one third
between 1925 and 1929; the price of minerals and other raw materials fell even
more sharply (Eichengreen 1992, p. 278-85).
What our narrative suggests is that the probability of any one country ’catch-
ing a bubble’ is related to the way monetary policy is conducted. We implicitly
assumed that there is an optimal policy for each country, which we do not observe
directly. Instead, we use a simple rule devised by Taylor to suggest appropriate
interest rates, and compare these with actual outcomes.
If our argument is correct, the probability of creating a bubble should be
directly related to the mismatch between actual and implied interest rates. We
de…ne a measure of policy failure as the absolute di¤erence between the actual
interest rate and the level implied by the Taylor rule.
Gt = rt ¡ [2 + ¼t + 0:5(yt ¡ y¤) + 0:5(¼t ¡ 2)] (2.1)
To what extent is the birth and continued existence of a bubble related to the
degree of policy failure? Table presents logit regressions using Gt as an explana-
tory variable.C is a constant and qt is output growth. In the US over the period
1923-1938, a bubble was more likely to develop when in‡ation was low, and when
the interest rate implied by the Taylor rule was above the actual short-term inter-
est rate (in this case, the call rate). Industrial output growth appears to have had
no systematic e¤ect on the likelihood of a bubble forming. Also, higher in‡ation
appears to have reduced the chances of a ’irrational exuberance’ taking hold.
2.2.2. Germany’s golden twenties
Interwar Germany experienced a brief boom after the hyperin‡ation and the Great
Depression. The slump came early – industrial production already turned down
in 1928, not to recover before 1936 (Wagemann 1936). The hyperin‡ation had
caused a major discontinuity in the institutional setup of central bank. With
stabilization in 1923, the Reichsbank became independent. The second half of
the twenties witnessed numerous clashes between the Reichsbank’s ‡amboyant
7
regression 1 2 3
C -1.4* -1.4* -2.2*
Gt 0.098* 0.1* 0.33*
qt 5.5 0.63
¼t -0.69*
% correctly classi…ed 67.1 68.3 71.7
Table 2.2: Logit regressions, US 1923-1938
president, Hjalmar Schacht, and various governments, attesting to the fact that
the central bank was indeed free from political meddling.
The German stock market experienced a brief boom after the hyperin‡ation.
While prices surged to astronomical levels, equity was remarkably cheap, partly as
a result of political uncertainty (Bittlingmayer 1998). On one day in 1923, all of
Mercedes-Benz could have been bought for the price of 237 of its cars. When the
currency stabilized, equity values surged. The boom was brie‡y interrupted by
an economic downturn in 1926, which lasted less than a year. Thereafter, stocks
resumed their upward movement, to the dismay of the Reichsbank. In 1927, it
decided that enough was enough. As well as (eventually) raising interest rates, it
leaned on the banks directly to curtail margin lending. When they went public
with their agreement to cut lending to brokers and investors by 25 percent over
the next few months, the market quickly collapsed.
Stock market returns were high in Germany prior to ”Black Friday” – the
stock market index increased by 164 percent between December 1925 and April
1927. Nonetheless, it remains doubtful if stocks were markedly overvalued. What
largely brought valuations back into line despite strong returns was the sharp
fall in interest rates, especially during 1926 (Voth 1999). In December 1925,
when the run-up in stock prices got underway, the Reichsbank began to lower the
discount rate of 9 percent. One year later, it had been cut to …ve percent. It was
only at the time of the crash that monetary policy became signi…cantly tighter.
With output recovering strongly from late 1926 onwards, …gure 2.2 shows that
monetary appears to have remained too loose for too long. Estimating an output
gap for Germany is di¢cult because of the disruptions of two world wars, the
hyperin‡ation, as well as changes in the Reich’s borders. To derive the interest
rate from the Taylor rule, we used the normal procedure of comparing actual
output to a quadratic trend for the period 1880 to 1962. This suggests that there
was no output gap in 1927 – industrial production had surged by 26 percent
8
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Figure 2.2: The German Stock market and Reichsbank discount rate, 1925 - 1928
year on year, and was 18.8 percent higher than in 1913 (Ho¤mann 1965, p. 390-
5). In‡ation was increasing. While, in the middle of the mini-recession in 1926,
the consumer price index increased by 0.25 percent p.a., in‡ation rose above 4
percent in 1927. The number of Germans in employment was growing strongly,
and investment was surging (Balderston 1992). The Taylor rule consequently
implies relatively high rates – an average of 9.5 percent for 1927. Instead, the
Reichsbank started the year with an interest rate of 5 percent, and had tightened
by 200 bp by the end of the year. Our analysis suggests that interest rates should
have been tightened further, by an additional 200 basis points, before the stock
market ”bubble” was pricked by the Reichsbank’s intervention.
If our calculations are a¤ected by the country’s tumultuous history and the
resulting data problems, how large would the error have to be to justify Reichsbank
policy? To derive an interest rate of 5 percent from the Taylor rule, the output
gap would have had to be 4 percent; an interest rate of 6 percent would have
required a gap of 2 percent. It is hard to see how Germany could have increased
output on such a scale without fanning the ‡ames of in‡ation.
2.2.3. Japan’s bubble years
Over the years 1983 to 1989, the Topix index of stock prices more than quadru-
pled. In‡ation was low over the period, barely broaching the 3 percent level in
1989. Over the period most often described as the ”bubble years” (1986-89), av-
erage cpi in‡ation was a mere 1.2 percent (as compared to 2.9 percent during the
…ve preceding years. The decline in oil prices was largely responsible, reducing
9
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Figure 2.3: Japanese monetary policy 1986-1992
regression 1 2 3
C -1.01* 1.16* 0.34
Gt 0.005 0.39* 0.3*
qt 22.5*
¼t -1.43* -1.36*
% correctly classi…ed 60.9 68.7 73.4
Table 2.3: Logit regressions, Japan 1983-1995
in‡ation to negative levels in 1987. At the same time, money growth (M2) accel-
erated, from around 5 percent in 1983 to 11.5 percent in 1988, before dropping
slightly.
Figure 2.3 shows that monetary policy was relatively tight for a signi…cant
part of the so-called bubble years. From late 1987, however, the central bank kept
interest rates signi…cantly lower than the Taylor rule suggests. Output growth was
clearly unsustainably rapid. Between the middle of 1987 and early 1989, industrial
output surged by 20.4 percent, equivalent to 13% annualized growth. This was
despite the fact that Japan appeared to be close to full capacity in 1987 already.
As in the US and Germany, there appears to be a systematic relationship
between the size of the policy mistake committed by the monetary authorities
and the chances of a bubble developing. This is most readily apparent once
in‡ation is added to the logit regression (table 2.3). As in the US, lower in‡ation
and rapid output growth increased the dangers of a bubble.
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Figure 2.4:
regression 1 2 3
C -3.6* -3.1* -3.81*
Gt -0.23 -0.19 -0.21
qt 37.9*
¼t -0.9 -0.14
% correctly classi…ed 87.9 87.9 88.4
Table 2.4: Logit regressions, UK 1983-1995
2.2.4. The UK in the 1980s
The UK bubble is unusual compared to the other episodes in our sample. The
total fall in the index is markedly smaller, and the bubble period lasted less than
a year. In its wider context, the bubble is best remembered for its e¤ect on the
housing market. Some studies make no mention of the UK stock market at all
(King 1999).
We dated the beginning of the bubble in the UK from the end of 1986. This
is indeed the point in time when monetary policy begins to become too expan-
sionary, as compared with the Taylor rule. However, after the bubble pops, there
is no change in the Bank of England’s behaviour, which supplies liquidity to the
…nancial system to avoid a credit crunch (as did the Fed in 1987). The housing
bubble, which only de‡ated in 1989, has often been seen as a result of this policy
(King 1999).
In the case of the UK, the logit regressions fail to show a signi…cant link
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between policy mismatch and the rise of a bubble. As noted before, the bubble
was perhaps too small (and lasted for too brief a period) to be analysed in this
fashion.
2.2.5. The Swedish bubble
Sweden experienced a rapid rise in share prices at almost exactly the same time as
Japan; also, the fall in prices was almost equally severe, bringing down the AFGX
index by 55 percent from its peak in October 1989 to the trough in September
1992. Initially, strong output growth went hand in hand with low in‡ation. From
the second half of 1987 onwards, Swedish interest rates were markedly lower than
the Taylor rule would have suggested. For the entire period until the end of the
bubble in 1989, monetary policy was not tight enough.
It also continued to be relatively loose after the stock market collapse; rising
in‡ation (reaching a peak of 13 percent in 1991) was the inevitable outcome.
Just as in the case of Japan, the policy mismatch measure only becomes large
and signi…cant if in‡ation is included in our regressions. Strong output growth
is negatively related to the chance of a bubble developing (presumably because
rising asset values are underpinned by improvements in fundamentals), and higher
in‡ation also undermines the chances of asset prices rising rapidly, only to collapse
shortly thereafter.
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regression 1 2 3
C -0.828* 1.83 2.5*
Gt 0.015 0.21* 0.27*
qt -35.6*
¼t -0.365* -0.44*
% correctly classi…ed 58.4 61.43 62.32
Table 2.5: Logit regressions, Sweden 1983-1995
3. Policy reaction functions
In the previous section, we essentially compared monetary policy across a range of
countries and periods that allegedly exhibited a ”bubble” with the prescriptions of
the Taylor rule. It is now time to present a more formal test of policy failure. We
proceed in two steps. First, we estimate policy reaction functions that describe
the actual conduct of monetary policy during the periods of asset price in‡ation.
Second, we augment the standard policy functions with stock prices to see if,
during the episodes analyzed in this paper, the central banks appeared to have
targeted the level of equity prices directly.
A general result of the simple comparisons in section 2 was that interest rates
were kept too low during the run-up in asset prices. Since most of these episodes
coincided with low in‡ation, it is possible that central banks did not pay su¢cient
attention to the general state of the economy. By remaining preoccupied with
in‡ation as such, and by not reacting to indicators of future in‡ation such as the
output gap, central bankers would have e¤ectively taken their eyes o¤ the ball.
To examine if this interpretation is correct, we estimate Taylor-style reaction
functions. The main di¤erence is that, following Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998),
we estimate forward-looking functions:
rt = ®+ ¯E¼t+1 + ° (yt ¡ by) + "t (3.1)
where E is denotes expectations. We assume that central banks attempt to
forecast over the next six months.3 Following Bernanke and Gertler (1999), we
also add stock prices to our reaction functions to examine if this has a major
e¤ect.
3Replacing the E¼t+1 with its actual realization will leave our results una¤ected as long as
the forecast error has zero mean.
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1 2 3
¯ 0.09* 0.11* 1.27*
° -0.1 0.1*
± 4.95*
® 5.2* 5.4* 0.99*
R2 0.14 0.14 0.9
Table 3.1: Policy reaction functions, US 1925-29
3.1. Interwar US
Taylor (1999) demonstrated that the standard approach to estimating policy reac-
tion functions can be applied to the gold standard period as well. This is especially
true of the United States, which acted as an ’anchor’ country for the interwar gold
standard.
For the period 1925-1929, there appears to be no in‡ation-targeting at all.
Equation 1 in table 3.1 suggests that the Fed kept interest rates at 5.2 percent on
average, and did little or nothing to raise them in response to changes in in‡ation.
The output gap also has no e¤ect on interest rate policy (eq. 2). More familiar
parameter estimates are only returned once explicit targeting of the stock market
is taken into account (eq. 3). Instead of being almost completely unresponsive
to changes in in‡ation, the Fed now appears as reasonably aggressive, raising real
interest rates by 27 basis points once in‡ation increases by one percentage point.
Note, however, that even this result is not true uniformly over time. Recursive
estimates of ¯ demonstrate that the Fed only showed a response larger than unity
from late 1928 onwards; before that date, it failed to tighten su¢ciently to keep
real rates from falling whenever in‡ation increased.
Targeting the stockmarket directly apparently did little to stabilize either the
course of output or prices.
3.2. UK
For the period 1983-96 as a whole, the Bank of England appears to have been
relatively tough on in‡ation. Even if it did not raise interest rates by 150 bp
for every 1 percentage point rise in in‡ation, as the Taylor rule would suggest,
it more than compensates for changes in in‡ation. As the recursive estimates of
¯ in …gure 3.2 make clear, this is largely a recent development. While initially
relatively tough – at least stabilizing real interest rates – monetary policy was
14
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1 2 3 4
¯ 1.04* 1.14* 0.98* 0.65*
° -0.19* -0.07 0.24*
± -3.43*
® 5.1* 4.67* 2.95* 3.05*
¸ 0.39* 0.46*
R2 0.61 0.64 0.7
Table 3.2: Policy reaction functions, UK 1982-1996
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Figure 3.2: Recursive estimates of ¯;UK 1982-1996
very weak before and during the bubble period. It is only after both the stock
market and the housing bubble have de‡ated that ¯ returns to values not too far
below unity.
The reaction to falls in the output gap is also relatively muted. There is no
clear evidence that, in reaction to output rising above trend, the Bank of England
would have raised rates. Only in the …nal speci…cation (4), which implies a neg-
ative response to rising equity values, is there any suggestion of countercyclical
policy.
3.3. Japan
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) report policy response functions for Japan for the
period 1979 to 1997. They …nd that, overall, the Bank of Japan was actively
trying to ”lean against the wind”, raising interest rates by 221 basis points for
every percentage point rise in interest rates, and by a further 20 bp for every
percentage point increase in the output gap.4 They also document that policy
seems to have reinforced the asset price explosion – for every ten percent increase
in stock prices, interest rates were lowered by 286 bp. This is, in all probability,
not the result of actual preferences of the Bank of Japan; rather, it seems to
have lowered rates in response to other factors (such as the Plaza Agreement on
4We …nd that, for the period 1983-89, the response of the bank to in‡ation and the output
gap was much lower. Bernanke’s and Gertler’s results may partly be driven by observations at
the beginning of their sample period, when output and interest rates moved sharply.
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1 2 3 4
¯ 0.54* 0.76* 0.27* 0.08*
° -0.08* 0.19* 0.22*
± -1.56*
® 7.74* 6.18* 5.18* 12.01*
¸ 0.66* 0.7*
R2 0.53 0.61 0.63 0.80
Table 3.3: Policy reaction functions, Sweden 1982-1996
exchange rate targets), thereby unwittingly acting to loosen monetary policy at
the very time when a stock market bubble was forming.
3.4. Sweden
In the case of Sweden, policy appears to have reacted only weakly to in‡ation;
interest rates were high generally, and a one percent rise in in‡ation never elicits
a response of at least 100 bp by the central bank. This implies that in booms,
interest rates will be too low, and a rise in in‡ation causes real rates to fall.
Speci…cation 2 shows that this problem appears to be compounded by an implied
negative response to the output gap. The former chairman of the Fed, Martin,
once said that the aim of good monetary policy should be to take the punchbowl
away when the party began to get going. The Swedish policy reaction functions
suggest that, instead of taking the bowl away, the Swedish central bank was more
prone to add a bit of gin to the punch. Regression 3 o¤ers one explanations for why
this seemingly perverse behaviour occurred. When we add German short-term
interest rates (with coe¢cient ¸) to our speci…cation, it proves a good predictor
of Swedish rates. The response to in‡ation is still too low, but once we control
for the e¤ect of German interest rates, there is a positive response to the output
gap. The …nal speci…cation adds stock prices to our policy reaction function.
Just as in the case of Japan, where Bernanke and Gertler (1999) found a negative
response to increases in stock prices, the our reaction functions imply a systematic
tendency to lower rates in the face of a stock market boom.
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4. A formal test
What our results suggest so far is that asset price volatility may be signi…cantly
related to policy errors. In particular, our historical case studies suggest that an
inability to raise interest rates su¢ciently when output is above trend may facili-
tate the growth of bubbles. Both the run-up in equity prices and the subsequent
bursting of the bubble increase volatility.
To test this hypothesis formally, we estimate GARCH-M models of the con-
ditional return volatility in equity prices. GARCH models have the bene…t of
capturing intertemporal volatility-clustering (Engle and Bollerslev 1986, Engle
and Ng 1993). Since investors expect to be be compensated for holding risky as-
sets, GARCH-M models have become popular (Elyasiani and Mansur 1998); they
are also straightforward in their application to national stockmarkets (Choudhry
1996). They incorporate the conditional variance into the return equation
yt = Áxt + ±
q
ht + "t (4.1)
ht = ! +
pX
j=1
¯jht¡j +
qX
j=1
®j"
2
t¡j (4.2)
where y is the stock return, x and z are a set of exogenous variables, " is a
random error, h is the conditional variance, and Á; ±; !; ¯; and ® are coe¢cients
to be estimated. A signi…cant ® implies the presence of ARCH. Returns are driven
by a set of exogenous variables and the conditional variance. ± is a measure of
the ”price of risk”. If our argument is correct, then including a measure of policy
failure, as proxied by the divergence between the interest rate set by a superior
policy rule and actual levels, should enter equation 4.2 signi…cantly.
We estimate GARCH-M(1,1) models for each country seperately, augmenting
equation 4.2 to give ht = !+° jGtj+Ppj=1 ¯jht¡j+Pqj=1 ®j"2t¡j where ° measures
the extent to which the variance is in‡uenced by inept monetary policy (from eq.
2.1). If our argument is correct, ° > 0.
For four out of …ve episodes – including the recent experience in the US –
there appears to be a systematic impact of policy failure on the volatility of equity
returns. The e¤ect was particularly strong in the US in the interwar period (where
its e¤ect is estimated at ten times its magnitude in the US today) and in Sweden
in the 1980s. Note that the consequences of policy errors appear una¤ected by
the extent to which volatility of returns is clustering intertemporally. While ®+¯
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UK US US Sweden Japan
1981-1997 1980-1999 1925-33 1982-1999 1984-1998
® 0.13* 1.12* 0.42* 0.19* 0.009
¯ 0.82 0.174* 0.09* 0.38 0.93*
° 0.00004* 0.00008* 0.0008* 0.00019 0.00009*
! 0.00003* 0.00027* 0.00004 0.001 0.000021
Table 4.1: GARCH-M(1,1) estimates
is close to unity in the cases of the UK, Japan, and the US in 1980-99, it was far
below that value in Sweden and the US in the interwar years.
5. Conclusion: A look at US policy 1996-99
If one lesson emerges clearly from our case studies, it is that a failure to account
for the output gap increases the danger of bubbles in asset markets developing.
The tendency to ”give growth a chance” is ultimately self-defeating, partly because
new eras driven by rapid increases in productive potential are few and far between.
The US today shows strong similarities with our case studies in four respects.
Growth has been unusually strong over the last 3 years, in‡ation has been low, and
asset prices have surged. Also, over the last two years, monetary policy appears
to have been too loose. As in the case of Japan, the US in the 1920, Sweden
and the UK, the main reason for this is a failure to account for the decline in the
output gap.
During Alan Greenspan’s tenure, monetary policy appeared to have followed
the Taylor rule to a surprising extent. Taylor (1999) argues that the higher re-
sponsiveness of monetary policy to both in‡ation and output growth during the
period 1987-97 was crucial for the lower level and greater stability of in‡ation.
Figure 5.1 suggests that policy has changed signi…cantly after 1996. While
low in‡ation suggested that rates should not be raised, the growing output gap
suggests that policy should have been tightened sharply after 1996. The failure
to raise rates aggressively – partly as a result of the Asian crisis in 1998 – has left
monetary policy too loose for a substantial period. This is exactly the combination
of factors that underpinned earlier asset bubbles with their associated boom-and-
bust cycles.
To examine if policy has indeed changed, as …gure 5.1 suggests, we estimate
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Figure 5.1: Federal Funds Rate and the Taylor Rule, US 1988 - 1998
coe¢cient 1987:10-1996:01 1987:10-1999:10 1994:01-1999:10
® 1.71* 0.43* 3.49*
¯ 1.48* 1.61* 0.57*
° 0.42* 0.21* 0.07*
R2 0.88 0.78 0.18
Table 5.1: OLS estimates of policy reaction functions
reaction functions for three periods, 1987:10 (when Greenspan took the reigns
at the Fed) to 1996:01, 1987:10-1999:10, and 1994:01-1999:10, where ® is the
intercept, ¯ the response to in‡ation, and ° the coe¢cient on the output gap.
A number of changes are apparent. First, the reaction to the output gap is
getting progressively weaker. Over the period 1994-99, a rise in the output gap
of 1 percent lead to a tightening of monetary policy by a mere 7 basis points.
Second, the reaction to increases in in‡ation has also become much weaker. Note
that, for ¯ < 1, ® > 2 for policy to stabilize at all (assuming a real interest rate of
2 percent). For the period 1994-99, we …nd that policy is still stabilizing overall
despite the weak responses to in‡ation and the output gap, but only because
® is relatively high. There appears to be a ”new economy” paradigm in US
monetary policy, given the way interest rates have reacted to in‡ation and output
growth. If the real interest rate has not increased, the resulting shift in the implied
equilibrium in‡ation rate is considerable. Figure 5.2 shows how much the implied
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Figure 5.2: Implied target level of in‡ation
target rate of in‡ation has shifted over the past …ve years. While policy for the
period 1987-96 points to a target rate of less than 1 percent, the conduct of the
Fed over the past 5 years suggests an implied rate of approximately 3.5 percent.
A Chow breakpoint test for 1996:01 yields an F-statistic of 29.8, su¢cient to
reject the null of no breakpoint at the 99% con…dence level. This is not to say
that underlying central bank preferences necessarily changed markedly. For most
of the period until 1996, output was below trend. If the central bank implicitly
tries to ”give growth a chance”, it will not respond symmetrically to positive and
negative output gaps. To test for this possibility more formally, we construct two
variables, ¢y+ and ¢y¡ for periods when actual output is either above or below
trend
¢y+ =
(
yt ¡ y¤
0
for yt ¡ y¤ > 0
for yt ¡ y¤ · 0 (5.1)
with ¢y¡ constructed analogously. We estimate coe¢cients °1 and °2 for
output gaps ¢y+ and ¢y¡ in the policy reaction functions. A simple measure
of monetary policy bias is then Á = °1
°2
. If central banks act equally against falls
in output below trend as they act against a surge above trend, Á = 1; Á < 1
implies that policy is more concerned with checking falls in output then it is with
curtailing excessive output growth. For the US for the period 1987:10 to 1999:10,
we obtain the estimates in table 5.2.
During downturns, the Fed brought down interest rates by 38 basis points for
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coe¢cient 1987:10-1999:01
® 1.53*
¯ 1.47*
°1 0.11*
°2 0.38*
R2 0.83
Table 5.2: OLS estimates of asymmetric policy reaction function
coe¢cient 1987:10-1999:9 1987:10-1999:9
® 0.5* 0.99*
¯ 1.58* 1.54*
° 0.25* 0.28*
± -0.172*
±1 -0.051*
±2 0.018
R2 0.76 0.78
Table 5.3: OLS estimates of policy reaction functions
every increase in the output gap by 1 percentage point, a relatively sharp response
(even if it is still markedly below the 50 bp implied by the Taylor rule). During
expansions, output growth above trend only causes an increase in the bank’s rate
by 11 bp. This implies Á = 0:28; during periods when output is above trend, the
Fed reacts with an interest rate move less than one third the size of that witnessed
during recessions.
Recently, some authors have suggested that a US-bubble today may partly be
underpinned by investors believing that the Fed will cut rates quickly if equity
prices fall. This would allow them to exit without all capital gains accrued so far
evaporating. In e¤ect, asymmetric policy responses by the central bank would
give investors a put option, allowing them to sell their shares at a …xed discount
to the current market level (Miller et al. 1999). To test for this possibility, we
apply the same method as was used for asymmetric output gap responses. We
estimate rt = ®+ ¯¼t+ °(yt¡ y¤) + ±1 (st ¡ s¤) + ±2 (st ¡ s¤) + "t; where st is the
level of the stock market index (for the US, the index of common stocks traded
on the NYSE) at time t, and ¤ denotes the long-term trend value of a variable.
±1 and ±2 are constructed analogously to °1 and °2:
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US policy appears to respond negatively to increases in stock prices (controlling
for the e¤ects of in‡ation and the output gap). The second column shows that,
while there appears to be some tendency for the Fed to lower rates during periods
when share prices slump, the same is true for periods when they surge above
trend.5 Not only is there no evidence of the Fed targeting asset prices, but its
policy appears to act perversely during bull markets. For every percentage point
that stock prices rise above their long-term trend level, interest rates are reduced
by 5 basis points. Note that this is an exact parallel with other periods when
bubbles were allowed to develop, such as in Japan during the late 1980s (Bernanke
and Gertler 1999) and the US 1925-29.
Recent research has highlighted the di¢culties inherent in making policy with
real-time data (Orphanides 1997). Revisions of national accounts and other pieces
of information that only become available later often make it di¢cult for central
banks to take recent developments into account. Note, however, that this is not the
kind of mismatch between sensible, forward-looking monetary policy and actual
conduct that we have found in this paper. Instead of lasting for a few quarters,
the policy mistakes that become apparent in the majority of cases have persisted
for at least two years.
A comparison of recent US policy with the …ve bubble episodes examined ear-
lier suggests that a hard landing may be impossible to avoid. Policy mistakes that
lead to painful boom and bust-cycles – such as the failure to take the output gap
into account – have been repeated. Our estimates suggest that, ceteris paribus, US
rates appear to have been lowered in the face of surging equity values. Concerns
about international …nancial stability have been allowed to dominate interest rate
policy. This is an exact parallel with the easing of US monetary policy in 1927,
designed to stabilize the resurrected gold standard. If past experience provides
any guidance, current policy will have to shoulder a signi…cant share of the blame
if a sudden slump in asset prices leads to recession.
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